Home » Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model: An Agent-Based Model by Michael J. Laver
Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model: An Agent-Based Model Michael J. Laver

Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model: An Agent-Based Model

Michael J. Laver

Published January 1st 2011
ISBN : 9781283246200
ebook
288 pages
Enter the sum

 About the Book 

Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questionsMoreParty competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. Here Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti offer the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. Laver and Sergenti model party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where todays political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterdays political outcomes.Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic valence advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.